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FIRST SECURITY STATE BANK, 
and UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
CO., et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 14,125 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
, STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a trust deed foreclosure action, Plaintiff-
Respondent Tracy Collins (Tracy) brought an action to foreclose 
a trust deed on the subject property and joined Appellants 
First Security State Bank and Utah Title and Abstract Company 
(Utah Title) as defendants and alleged that their rights were 
subsequent and inferior to Tracy's. First Security State 
Bank also prayed for foreclosure against the debtor. The 
lower court determined priority in favor of Tracy and gave 
judgment of foreclosure against the debtor first to Tracy 
and then to First Security State Bank. The question presented 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is whether First Security State Bank is entitled to 
priority over Tracy because although Tracy had recorded 
a trust deed in its favor on March 16, 1973 Tracy did not 
lend nor was obliged to lend any money or otherwise create 
a debt secured by said trust deed and in fact did not use 
or activate the note for which the trust deed was security 
until May 10, 1974 which date is subsequent to the record-
ing of First Security State Bank's trust deed. Tracy's trust 
deed was not part of a construction loan transaction. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, presiding, determined that Tracy's trust deed 
was entitled to priority over First Security State Bank's 
trust deed and awarded judgment of foreclosure giving 
Tracy right to the first proceeds derived from the fore-
closure of the property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
First Security State Bank and Utah Title seek 
reversal of the lower court's decision as to the relative 
priority of First Security State Bank's lien, and ask this 
Court to determine that the effective date of Tracy's 
lien was May 10, 197 4 and therefore subject to and in-
ferior to First Security State Bank's lien. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 14, 1973, Richard H. Seiger and 
Connie Seiger executed a $50,000 note payable to Tracy 
(Exhibit 1-P), which note was secured by a trust deed of 
the same date on certain real property in Salt Lake County, 
which trust deed was recorded on March 16, 19 73 (Exhibit 
2-P). Tracy sought to foreclose said deed as a mortgage 
in this action. 
2. A note from Jerry and Ann Timothy to First 
Security State Bank secured by a trust deed covering the 
above real property was executed August 24, 1973 and 
said trust deed was recorded August 28, 1973 (Exhibit 9-D). 
After being joined as a defendant, First Security State 
Bank also prayed for foreclosure of said deed as a mortgage. 
3. From the time of the execution of the 
March 14, 19 73 Seiger note and trust deed in favor of 
Tracy and until May 10, 19 74,it is clear from the 
testimony of Robert Bagley, an assistant vice president 
of Tracy, that: 
(a) Tracy disbursed no funds nor made any 
advances under the $50,000 note to the 
Seigers, or to any other person or 
account (R. 275); 
(b) Tracy did not establish any account 
whatever on the $50,000 note (R. 275); 
(c) Tracy did not consider the $50,000 
note of March 14, 1973 an indebtedness 
of Seigers until May 10, 1974 (R. 282-83); 
(d) No interest accrued on said note (R. 264); 
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(e) Although the $50,000 March 14, 1973 
note was due by its own terms on June 
1, 1973, no efforts were made to 
collect it because said note was 
not then considered by Tracy to be 
an obligation of the Seigers (R. 281). 
4. Tracy did not consider the $50,000 note an 
indebtedness of Seigers until May 10, 1974, when on that 
date Tracy used the $50,000 note for the first time for 
any purpose, and at that time for the purpose of renewing an 
existing $55,000 note of Seiger Distribution Co. on which 
note $48,323.51 was owed. (R. 262-63). 
5.. Mr. Bagley also testified that May 10, 
1974, was the first time that any accounting of any nature 
was set up for the $50,000 Seiger note. (R. 270, 275). 
6. Mr. Bagley stated that the $50,000 note 
did not become an indebtedness of Seigers until the time of 
renewal of the prior note of Seiger Distributing Co. by 
Tracy in May, 1974. (R. 282). 
7. By its clear terms the trust deed to Tracy 
was security only for the $50,000 note and does not refer 
to any other security or indebtedness whatever. (exhibit 
2-P) . 
8. There is no evidence whatever of any 
obligation incurred by Tracy in March, 1973, to advance 
any funds pursuant to the $50,000 note at that or any 
other time. 
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BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OBLIGATION 
ON TRACY TO ADVANCE FUNDS AND NO 
FUNDS WERE ADVANCED UNTIL MAY 10, 
19 74, TRACY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
PRIORITY BEFORE THAT DATE. 
The fundamental issue on appeal is whether a 
trust deed creates a lien entitled to priority where 
there is no obligation underlying the trust deed. 
The general rule is stated in 55 Am. Jur. 2d 
Mortgages §§ 132, 133: 
The dominant feature of a real-estate 
mortgage is generally regarded as that of 
security for the debt, to which it is col-
lateral, appurtenant, or an accessory, and 
on which it is dependant. In other words, 
the debt secured by a mortgage is regarded 
as the primary obligation between the 
parties, and the mortgage is incidental 
to the indebtedness or obligation secured 
thereby. Under this rule, the lien of a 
mortgage is regarded as no greater than 
the actual debt secured. 
The existence of an obligation to be 
secured is an essential element of a mort-
gage. The mortgage has no efficacy if 
unaccompanied by a debt or obligation, 
either pre-existing, created at the time, 
or contracted to be created. 
The trust deed (Exhibit 2-P) given priority by 
the lower court recites the obligation as follows: 
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The subject property is transferred to 
the Trustee for the purpose of securing the 
following: 
ONE: Payment of the indebtedness evid-
enced by a Promissory Note executed as of 
even date herewith in the face amount of 
$50,000 and any renewals and/or extensions and/ 
or modifications thereof together with 
interest thereon, prepayment penalties (which 
are also applied if the payment of the note 
is accelerated by reason of default) and other 
charges provided in said note. 
TWO: Payment of further advances and 
interest thereon, which may be made by 
Beneficiary as provided herein* 
17. Upon the request of the Trustor or 
his successors in ownership of the land, the 
Beneficiary may hereafter at its option, at 
any time before full payment of the indebted-
ness secured hereby, make further advances to 
the Trustor or his successors in ownership, 
and the same, with interest and late charges, 
shall be secured by this Trust Deed; . . . 
(Emphasis Supplied). 
The note (Exhibit 1-P) recites simply that the 
Seigers promise to pay $50,000 on demand or 9 3 days after 
date (March 14, 197 3) to Tracy and that the same is secured 
by a "2nd Trust Deed to Payee, dated 2-26-7 3 on business 
property." 
Mr. Robert D. Bagley, Tracy's own witness, test-
ified as follows concerning said note: 
(R. 270) Q. So, in fact, in March of 1973 when 
the note and trust deed were given there were no funds 
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disbursed by the Bank to an account, to Seigers, or to 
anybody else? 
A. From the — not from the $50,000. 
(R. 275) Q. And then no funds were disbursed at 
that time, no account was set up, nothing was done with re-
ference to those two documents until May of 1974* 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then in May of 1974, I think May 10th, 
1974, you transferred in essence, funds from the $50,000 
note in essence, you made it an active note at that time, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So would it be a fair statement to say that 
as of May 10th, 1974 that was the first time that any 
funds or any accounting of any nature was set up on the 
$50,000 note dated March 14th, 1973? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 281) Q. Mr. Bagley, I have just handed you 
Exhibit P-l and that is the note involved in 19 73, can you 
tell me when that note was due? 
A. June 1, 1973. 
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Q. And was it paid on June 1, 197 3? 
A. It was not. 
So June 1, '73, you didn't refer it to your 
No, not at that date. 
Nor make any other attempt at collection? 
No. 
(R. 282) A. March 14, '73. 
Q. At that point did you get any authority to 
lend Mr. Seiger an additional $50,000 such that the total 
amount of his obligation to Tracy Collins would be $105,000? 
A. Well, here again the $50,000 wasn't con-
sidered indebtedness to Mr. Seiger at that point. 
(R. 283) Q. So we may say then that the $50,000 
note did not come — let's say was not outstanding and an 
indebtedness of Mr. Seiger until that time, [May 10, 1974], 
that's right, is it not? 
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Q. At anytime after June 1 of 1973 you could 
have disbursed the funds on the $50,000 note in payment 
of the $55,000 note could you? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. 265) Q. As a matter of fact, it could be 
drawn on for various purposes, couldn't it? 
A. Yes, there was no stipulation as to 
appointed amount of money for a particular purpose. 
(R. 266) Q. On May 10th or at the time that 
these notes were — or the funds "were disbursed on the 
$50,000 note, Exhibit 1-P, was notice sent to Mr, Seiger 
of that action? 
A. Yes, not from me, however, from our counsel, 
(R. 261) Q. And were the funds that are shown 
on that $50,000, was that actually disbursed? 
A. Yes it was. 
Q. When was that disbursed? 
A. I can't remember the exact date. 
Q. Would you like to refer to the note? 
A. Yes, if I may, please. May 10th, 1974. 
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Q. What was the amount of money that was 
actually disbursed? 
A. $48,323.51. 
Q. How does that note relate to the $55,000 
note that is Exhibit 3-P? 
A. Well, the $55,000 was renewed to the 
$50,000, in other words, the funds from the undisbursed 
money, the $50,000 were used to pay off the $55,0 00 note. 
Q. Now, does that show on both notes? 
A. Yes it does. 
Q. Can you explain those figures for the court 
and counsel? Explain what happened, where the $55,000 
note, Exhibit 3-P was reduced to zero. 
A. On May 10th, 1974, the balance of the note 
was transferred from the $55,000 note to the renewal note 
for $50,000 and that amount that was transferred is — 
shows on the back of the $50,000 note. 
(R. 263) THE COURT: I understand the $55,000 
note is paid? 
THE WITNESS: Renewed. 
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Th e conclusion which must be drawn from the 
above testimony of Tracy's own witness is that the 
note, Exhibit 1-P, did not represent any kind of a 
debt or obligation of the Seigers until May 10, 19 74, 
which debt was not due and payable until 10 days after 
the demand made in Exhibit 5-P, which was May 23, 19 74. 
A trust deed or mortgage must be supported by 
an obligation or fail* "A mortgage is incident to the 
obligation which it is given to secure." First National 
Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 
P.2d 1401. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-19(3) (1953) 
defines a trust deed as follows: 
(3) "Trust Deed" means a deed executed 
in conformity with this act and conveying 
real property to a trustee in trust to secure 
the performance of an obligation of the 
grantor or other person named in the deed 
to a beneficiary. (Emphasis supplied). 
Section 57-1-20 provides: 
Transfers in trust of real property may 
be made to secure the performance of an 
obligation of the trustor or any other per-
son named in the trust deed to a beneficiary. 
. . . (Emphasis supplied). 
Section 57-1-35 provides: 
The transfer of any debt secured by a 
trust deed shall operate as a transfer of 
the security therefor* (Emphasis supplied). 
The idea consistantly contained in the above sections of 
the Code is that a trust deed is a security device to 
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secure a debt or obligation. Tracy1s witness 
clearly stated that the $50,000 note was not an 
obligation of its makers until long after Appellants' 
security interest was perfected. 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Freutel vs. 
Schmitz, 299 Illinois 320, 132 N.E. 534 stated: 
A mortgage is security for a debt, and without 
a debt it has no effect as a lien . . . A 
mortgage may be taken to secure future ad-
vances, but it can only take effect as a lien 
from the time some debt or liability secured 
by it is created. If there is no mortgage 
debt or obligation in existence, there is 
nothing for the mortgage to operate on and 
the lien begins only when the money is ad-
vanced or the contemplated debt comes into 
existence in the course of dealing with the 
parties. The lien is measured by the extent 
of the advances and the amount of the debt. 
In Ginsberg v. Capitol City Wrecking Company, 
300 Mich. 712, 2 N.W.2d 892, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
in discussing a mortgage stated: 
The instrument can only take effect as a 
mortgage or encumbrance from the time when 
some debt or liability shall be created, or 
some binding contract is made, which is to be 
secured by it. Until this takes place, 
neither the land nor the parties, nor the 
third persons, are bound by it. It con-
stitutes, of itself, no binding contract. 
Either party may either disregard or repudiate 
it at its pleasure. It is but part of an 
arrangement, merely contemplated as probable 
and which can only be rendered effectual by 
the future consent and future act of the 
parties. 2 N.W. 2d at 894. 
Failure of Respondent Tracy to perfect its 
attempted lien by creating an obligation or debt renders 
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th e unperfected lien subject to subordination in 
priority to valid subsequent liens until the date 
Tracy acknowledges a debt was created. Its inchoate 
lien was capable of perfection or vesting only when 
the debt arose. 
The reversal of the trial court in the instant 
case would do no harm to "future advance mortgages" used 
to secure construction loans, or impair additional 
security mortgages given to secure antecedent debts. 
In both of the latter cases, adequate safeguards are 
available to insure that these devices are enforceable 
and provide priority protection. The case law clearly 
indicates, however, that a note and mortgage instrument, 
even if recorded, are effective as of the date of 
recording only where funds are advanced against the 
note, or there is a present enforceable obligation 
undertaken at the date of recording to make future 
advances, or the mortgage is securing a specific and 
identified antecedent debt recited in the mortgage or 
trust deed instrument. 
The above rule regarding future advances was 
stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Second National 
Bank of Warren v. Boyle, 155 Ohio 484, 99 N."E.2d 474: 
Obviously where there is no obligation to make 
future advances, a mortgage, purporting to 
secure such future advances, cannot secure such 
advances until the advances have been made. Until 
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th en so far as such advances are concerned, 
there is nothing for the mortgage to secure; and 
the provisions of such a mortgage merely repre-
sent an expression of the intention of the 
mortgagor and the mortgagee that the mortgage 
shall operate as a security for the obligations 
of the mortgagor with respect to such advances 
if and when such obligations arise. At most, 
those provisions represented the offer by the 
mortgagor to provide the security of the 
mortgage for such advances if and when, they 
are made. 
Future advance arrangements without a current 
debt have been variously called "cross-security clauses," 
dragnet clauses", or "anaconda mortgages". G. Gilmore, 
Security Interests in Personal Property § 35.2 at 918 
(1965). Such arrangements are "not highly regarded in 
equity. They should be carefully scrutinized and strictly 
construed." First v. Byrne, 238 Iowa 712, 715, 28 N.W.2d 
509, 511, 172 A.L.R. 1072, 1075 (1947). And stated 
another way: 
Mortgages of this character have been denomin-
ated "Anaconda mortgages" and are. well named 
thus, as by their broad and general terms they 
enwrap the unsuspecting debtor in the folds of 
indebtedness embraced and secured in the 
mortgage which he did not contemplate. 
Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 377, 21 S.W.2d 419, 421 
(1929) . 
Such clauses should only be enforced where a 
rule of reason and good faith are applied to the mortgagee 
and subsequent intervening lienors. The conceptual analysi 
of the validity of a mortgage providing for future advances 
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but where there is no present advance, is described as 
follows: 
There can be no mortgage without a debt; 
if there is ever a moment when there is 
no debt, then there is no mortgage; if 
there is no mortgage, there is nothing 
to which the future advances can "relate 
back". 
G. Gilmore, Supra, at § 35.3 at 924. 
Even where optional future advances are agreed 
upon, it is not settled whether the advance can relate back: 
Where an agreement provides for optional 
future advances and no advance is made when 
the mortgage is executed, the mortgage does 
not become effective until the first advance 
is made; it does not relate back to the date 
of the agreement. 
Osborne on Mortgages, § 114 (1951). 
All the commentators seem to agree that some 
commitment recited in the security instrument on the 
part of the mortgagee to supply advances in the ascer-
tainable future is essential. See H. E. Meeks, Mortgage 
Provivions Extending the Lien to Future Advances and 
Antecedent Indebtedness, 26 Ark. L. Rev. 423, 443-51 (1973). 
The case law and authorities cited indicate 
that a security instrument given to secure future ad-
vances is given priority as of the date of recordation only 
if there is a contractual obligation to make the future 
advances. See also, 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, § 140. 
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In the instant case, there is no evidence of such a con-
tractual obligation. In fact, Tracy's own evidence is to 
the contrary. Any disbursements were in Tracy's sole 
discretion, and there was no obligation on Tracy's part to 
expend any funds from the $50,000 note at all. Tracy's 
failure to take any action whatever for nearly a year beyond 
the note's stated due date confirms this. 
Tracy alleged in the lower court that the trust 
deed, Exhibit 2-P, was executed to secure a note (Exhibit 3-P) 
dated December, 19 72, made by Seiger Distributing Co. payable 
to Tracy secured by a financing statement covering inventory 
(bicycles). (R. 258). 
However, the 1972 note (Exhibit 3-P) continued 
beyond March 14, 1973, and was not renewed by the March 14, 
1973, note until May 10, 1974. (R. 275). The March 14, 1973 
note (Exhibit 1-P) and the trust deed (Exhibit 2-P) 
nowhere recite that they were executed to secure the 1972 
note or debt it evidenced. No funds were disbursed or set 
aside for the March 14, 197 3 note, but the contention that 
the note was to provide additional security for the 1972 note 
is completedly contradicted by the wording of the documents 
and the testimony of Mr. Bagley: 
(R. 265) Q. As a matter of fact, it [the March, 
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1973 note] could be drawn on for various purposes, 
couldn't it? 
A. Yes, there was no stipulation as to appointed 
amount of money for a particular purpose. (Emphasis 
Supplied). 
The note and trust deed (Exhibits 1-P and 2-P) 
do not state that they are security for an antecedent in-
debtedness. The evidence is in fact to the contrary as 
cited above. 
That an antecedent debt in a proper case may act 
as the indebtedness for a new note and mortgage is not con-
tested. In Abraham v. Abraham, 15 Utah 2d 430 (1964) this 
court held that an antecedent indebtedness may be consideration 
for a note and mortgage executed to evidence and secure an 
antecedent debt. In the Abraham case, the mortgage and note 
challenged were executed pursuant to a written contract 
providing for the note and mortgage, along with the payment 
of $350.00 cash. 
In the instant case, Mr. Bagley testified that 
although the proceeds of the note (Exhibit 1-P) were going to 
be placed in a bank control account until June 1, 1973 (R. 264), 
nothing was done. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
(R. 270) Q. So, in fact, in March of 1973 
when the note and trust deed were given, there were no 
funds disbursed by the bank [Tracy Collins] to an account, 
to Seigers, or to anybody else? 
A. From the — not from the $50,000. 
(R. 275) Q. And then no funds were disbursed 
at that time, no account was set up, nothing was done 
with reference to those two documents until May of 1974? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So would it be a fair statement to say 
that as of May 10th, 1974 that was the first time that 
any funds or any accounting of any nature was set up on 
the $50,000 note dated March 14, 197 3? 
A. Yes. 
The facts of the Tracy and Seiger transaction based 
on admissions by Mr. Bagley, are not adequate to support 
Tracy's position that a lien attached, good against all sub-
sequent encumbrancers, before any real consideration in the 
form of advances existed. Neither the trust deed nor the note 
recites that it secures any specific existing debt. The 
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clear testimony in evidence is that Exhibit 1-P did not 
evidence any debt until May 10, 1974. Where an antecedent 
indebtedness is to be secured by a mortgage, a description 
of such may easily be inserted in the instrument. 
55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, § 152 states as follows: 
It is a general rule of law that a 
mortgage must truly describe the debt in-
tended to be secured, including the nature 
thereof, and that an obligation is not 
secured by a mortgage unless it comes 
fairly within the terms of the mortgage. 
* The trust deed in this case, Exhibit 2-P, was 
issued to secure an indebtedness evidenced by the $50,000 note, 
Exhibit 1-P, not the $55,000 note, Exhibit 3-P. 
CONCLUSION 
Tracy is not entitled to priority before May 10, 
1974. Tracy had complete control of the situation for many 
months and could have taken steps to perfect its security -and 
priority position. Instead, it held in limbo for 14 months 
a note by parties different from the original debtor; 
the trust deed covered property other than that used 
as security for the $55,000 note; there is nothing in 
the trust deed to indicate that it was security for or in 
any manner connected with any debt other than the note 
for $50,00 0; and Tracy's own witness confirmed that there 
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was no indebtedness on the $50,000 note until May 10, 1974, 
Tracy is not entitled to priority before that date. 
DATED t h i s ghd day of August, 1975 
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